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REFORMING THE RENTIER STATE: 
THE IMPERATIVES FOR CHANGE 
IN THE GULF 
Robert Looney 
On a journey through the Kingdom, r heard the word reform everywhere 
r went, though no one seemed to agree on exactly what it meant. 
-Elizabeth Rubin 1 
INTRODUCTION 
An economic irony that is gaining increasing attention is the "resource curse" 
effect, whereby many of the poorest and most troubled states in the develop-
ing world have paradoxically the highest levels of natural wealth.2 In fact, a rap-
idly growing body of literature suggests that resource wealth itself~ especially 
where it accounts for the bulk of government revenues, as in the case of the so-
called rentier states;' may harm a country's prospects for development. 
Country growth data bear this out: renticr states, with greater natural resource 
wealth, tend to grow more slowly than their resource-poor counterparts.4 
This "rentier state" effect is beginning to manifest itself in what arc com-
monly thought of as some of the wealthiest regions of the world.' In the 
Persian Gulf, for example, relatively stable levels of oil production and flat oil 
revenues, combined with an unanticipated rapid increase in population, have 
resulted in declining per capita income in Saudi Arabia. At the height of the 
oil boom in the 1980s, Saudi Arabia's per capita income was around 
US$17,000. By 2003 this figure had declined to about US$8,200. 
The Saudi Arabian example is not unique. The unfortunate fact is that 
most oil-rich developing countries are undcrperformers across a whole spec-
trum of economic, social, political, and governance standards. Large windfall 
gains associated with a rapid increase in oil prices have been a particular 
problem in that they appear to create severe distortions in the working of 
the economy and the political system with strongly negative sociopolitical 
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proved overwhelming, undermining even the best etforts to develop each 
~ountry's non-oil economy, eradicate poverty, and improve living standards 
tor broad-based segments of the population. 
There is still great controversy over the best way to escape the rentier syn-
drome. for some analysts, a microeconomic approach stressing increased 
competition, privatization, and greater incentives for risktaking is key. For 
others, the establishment of supporting macroeconomic institutions, such as 
a sound financial system and efficient, equitable tax systems, play a central 
role. Others focus on the necessity of developing stable and etlective macro-
economic policies-the efficient timing and focus of fiscal and monetary poli-
cies. In addition, a growing school of thought suggests that governance 
issues predominate. The failure of the rentier states to eliminate corruption 
whil~ developing responsive government institutions is the main factor 
accounting for poor economic performance in the rentier states. 
A related controversy surrounds the extent to which useful generalizations 
can be made about the rentier economies. Although all share a number of 
common structural conditions, are these similar enough to form an economic 
environment that responds predictably to a common set of policy initiatives? 
Or is each rentier economy likely to have unique features to the extent that 
require a tailor-made economic program for achieving, growth, diversifica-
tion, and integration into the global economv? 
This chapter examines these issues from the perspective of the two largest 
rentier states in the Gult:._Saudi Arabia and Iran. What do these economies 
share in common? What are their chief differences? Which has made the most 
progress to date in transitioning away from the rentier state svndrome? What 
tasks lay before them in their integration to the world econu'my? In particu-
lar, which area of refrirms appear critical for successful transition to a more 
normal economy capable of generating self.sustained growth independent of 
conditions in the oil markets? Based on the answers to these questions, a final 
section examines the implications for Iraq. 
RENTIER MALAISE 
The recent oil price increases have given both Saudi Arabia and Iran a tem-
porary reprieve from their longer-run economic dilemmas. Both countries 
are experiencing transitions that arc complex and decisive for tl1eir futures. 
Both are facing a dual set of problems: on the one hand, those of a develop-
m? country and, on the other, those ofa rentier economy. Both possess some 
of the main characteristics of a developing country: a predominantly young 
population and an economy mainly focused on the primary sector-oil for 
both, with Iran having, in addition, a large agricultural sector. 
The rcnticr nature of both economics is no less evident: revenues derived 
from oil represent the bulk of public and external revenues. In essence, these 
revenues enable the governments in each country to dominate the private 
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large. In short, the collection and subsequent redistribution of oil revenues 
takes on both an economic and political dimension. Both economies are 
faced with dual challenges: first, transforming the rentier economy into a 
diversified economy through encouraging expansion in the non-oil private 
sector areas of activity and, second, implementing the political reforms 
necessary for establishing institutions and governance structures capable of 
creating an environment conducive to enabling non-oil activities to operate 
on a sustained basis. 
Saudi Arabia 
Within this context, Saudi Arabia is currently facing a number of challenges. 
The first problem involves attaining and maintaining economic growth rates 
that are least sufficient to keep pace with the rise in population. For Saudi 
Arabia, low economic growth has become a chronic problem (see table 3.1 ). 
Gross domestic product (GDP) increased by only 1.6 percent between 1990 
and 2000, whereas growth in the country's population grew at an annual 
rate of 2 .7 percent during that period, thus producing a declining trend in 
per capita income.6 
This low rate of growth cannot be attributed to a lack of capital formation. 
In fact, the rate of investment is relatively high in Saudi Arabia. The Sixth 
Development Plan (1995-2000), for instance, envisaged a total capital of 
around 472 billion riyals ($125.8 billion), including nearly 212.7 billion 
riyals ($56.7 billion) from the private sector. It had also targeted an economic 
growth rate of 3.8 percent over the plan period. By the end of the plan, actual 
investment increased by around 2 percent to 481 billion riyals ($128.2 billion) 
including nearly 292 billion riyals ($77.8 billion) from the private sector, 
an increase of around 37 percent over the projected lcvel.7 
Thus, even though the plan overachieved in terms of investment, it under-
achieved in terms of what really counts: real economic growth. The ineffec-
tiveness of investment to sustain growth appears to be structural, stemming 
in part from a weakening of the linkage between public and private expendi-
tures together with a decline in the ability of public expenditures to stimulate 
real output. 8 Given the inability of the public sector to directly stimulate real 
Table 3.1 Saudi Arabia: GDP growth, 1960-2002 (average 
annual rate of growth) 
GDP measure 1960-2002 1970-2002 1980-2002 
Oil 3.8 2.3 -0.9 
Private 8.8 8.9 2.0 
Public 5.9 5.1 3.0 
Total 5.7 4.7 1.0 
Non-oil 7.4 7.1 2.3 
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non-oil output, all of the pressure to provide expanded employment oppor-
tunities, jobs, and output is now placed on the private sector. 
Job creation is then the second major problem facing the region. Ironically, 
even though the Saudi economy is heavily dependent on foreign workers 
( 4.6 million or 71 percent of the country's workforce), the unemployment rate 
among Saudis is 8.2 percent, reaching 32 percent among younger workers. 
The third challenge relates to maintaining the pace of economic reforms. 
Here the Saudis have initiated a series of measures designed to attract foreign 
investment, deregulate many key industries, and liberalize the economy to qualify 
for membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) as well as to facilitate 
further economic integration with the country's tellow GCC members. 
If carried out successfully, economic reforms should remove many of the 
constraints currently impeding growth and job creation in the private sector. 
As discussed below, this is critical, given the current inability of public expen-
ditures to perform this task. The country's three main challenges-restoring 
rates of growth above that of the population, expanding job creation, and 
implementing a comprehensive reform package-appear to he relatively 
compatible. Good progress in the reform area should assure higher rates of 
economic growth and, through that, more jobs. But will they be jobs for Saudis? 
Apparently, the government is not confident this will be the case because it is 
simultaneously broadening and expanding its Saudization program. The 
Saudi government appears to feel that if jobs cannot be created through high 
rates of investment, then they must be forced through quotas. 
Iran 
Iran faces a similar set of challenges. Although the country's growth has not 
decelerated (sec table 3.2) to the extent found in Saudi Arabia, there are sev-
eral troubling trends.9 During 1960-76, Iran enjoyed one of the fastest 
growth rates in the world. The economy grew at an average rate of9.8 per-
cent in real terms and real per capita income growth averaged 7 percent. 
This growth trend was reversed during 1977-88, reflecting the aftereffects 
of the 1979 revolution, the eight-year war with Iraq, sanctions and interna-
tional isolation, the increased state dominance of the economy, and plummet-
ing oil output and revenue. In 1988, oil production was only 36 percent of its 
Tahle 3.2 Iran: Average s~croral growth, 1960-2002 
Period 1960-76 1977-88 1989-2002 1960---2002 
Agriculture 4.6 3.9 4.1 4.2 
Oil and Gds 10.0 -8.6 2.5 2.4 
Industries and Mines 14.0 -1.3 7.3 7.6 
Services 11.1 -1.9 4.8 5.4 
Non-nil <.iDP growth 10.l -0.5 5.0 5.5 
GDP 9.8 -2.4 4.7 4.6 
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level in 1976 and oil prices were 40 percent lower in real terms. This resulted 
in a negative real GDP growth of 2.4 percent per annum. Excluding oil out-
put, non-oil GDP also declined, averaging a fall of0.5 percent per annum. 
With the reconstruction effort and partial recovery in oil output, real eco-
. nomic growth recovered during 1989-2002, averaging 4.7 percent per 
annum. This period, however, was marked by sharp fluctuations in the 
growth pattern as the postwar economic boom ( 1989-2002) was followed 
· by the stagnation of 1993-94 when the economy was hit by lower oil prices, 
lack of external financing, and economic sanctions. The ensuing severe debt 
crisis, together with inappropriate macroeconomic policies, had an adverse 
impact on growth, which hovered around 3.6 percent during 1995-2000. 
In the more recent period (2000-03), real GDP grmvth has increased to 
6 percent due to significance progress in economic reforms: exchange rate 
unification, trade liberalization, opening up to foreign direct investment 
(FDI), and financial sector liberalization. Higher oil prices and expansionary 
monetary and fiscal policies have also contributed to the country's recent 
economic recovery. 
As is the case with Saudi Arabia, growing unemployment is becoming a 
major social and political problem. During the 1996-2000 period, 693,000 
new workers entered the labor market whereas only 296,000 jobs were cre-
ated. The result is a current rate of unemployment of over 20 percent of the 
active population. This unemployment mainly affects the young urban pop-
ulation. According to the World Bank, the creation of between 700,000 to 
800,000 new jobs each year (thereby achieving unemployment rate stability) 
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Iran is attempting to put more flexibility and job creating capacitv into its 
~conomy through a series of reforms. Although some progress has ~ccurred 
111 the last several years, the country still lags considerably behind Saudi 
Arabia in many critical areas. Using the aggregate economic freedom index 
discussed below (where higher numbers signify lower levels of freedom), it is 
interesting to note a general backsliding in Saudi reform efforts, whereas 
those in Iran appear to be cautiously moving ahead (see figure 3 .1). 
Although notable differences exist, Saudi Arabia and Iran appear to share 
a number of common economic characteristics and face a set of similar chal-
lenges. In recent years many of these problems seem to have intensified, per-
haps because the pace of population growth, globalization, and technological 
change are outpacing the ability of the rentier system to effectively resolve 
new challenges as they arise. 
COMMONALITIES ASSOCIATED WITH OIL 
In attempting to explain the inability of rentier economies to sustain steady 
expansions in their economies, most researchers have focused on their mo;t 
apparent defining teatures: the manner in which oil revenues accrue to the 
government and the subsequent impacts the utilization of these revenues have 
on economic activity. In this regard, a large literature has spawned in recent 
years attempting to clarify some of the complex and negative transmission 
mechanisms associated with oil revenues, especially those that occur during 
pe~ods of rapidly rising petroleum prices.10 There are many competing expla-
nations, but they are not necessarily mutually exclusive.11 They may reinforce 
each other, resulting in a slowing of economic growth and productivity. In 
extreme cases, the non-oil sector of the economy even begins to contract. 
One way to understand the uniqueness of the rentier state is to contrast its 
dynamics to that of a normal economy, known as the production state (see 
table 3.3 ). Because the rentier state is not based on broad-based production, 
its main dynamic stems from the forces set in motion by the distribution of 
revenues. Several mechanisms associated with this expenditure help define 
the rcntier state's rather unique development pattern. 
Table 3.3 Rentier or allocative versus non-rentier or production states 
Production states 
State based on extractive capability 
and cr<>notni( growth -
Representational pressures and political 
conflict over economic policy 
Unequal distribution of wealth kads to 
pressures for redistribution of change 
Remier states 
State based on rent 
Economic policies do not create same degrees of 
political conflict or repn:sentational pressures 
Spends without taxing 
Distribution of rent-generated wealth creates less 
pressure to change status quo 
REFORMING THE RENTIER STATE 43 
The Dutch Disease Effect 
The mechanism that has probably gained the most attention in academic 
.circles is the so-called Dutch Disease. This phenomenon has two effects both 
.of which should concern postwar Iraq. The first focuses narrowly on the 
exchange rate. In technical terms, the Dutch Disease refers to the potentially 
adverse effects of a booming export sector on the performance of other 
exports and of industries competing against imports. These effects work 
through a strengthening (appreciation) of the exporting country's exchange 
rate. In the 1960s, the Netherlands experienced a vast increase in its wealth 
after discovering large natural gas deposits in the North Sea. Unexpectedly, 
this seemingly positive development had serious repercussions on important 
segments of the country's economy, as the Dutch guilder became stronger 
(a 30 percent appreciation), making Dutch non-oil exports less competitive. 
The exchange rate appreciation resulting from a ramp-up of oil exports is 
likely to reduce the profitability and competitiveness of traditional agricul-
tural exports. It would also encourage imports of food and raw materials, 
which may compete with domestic production. It is also likely to discourage 
the emergence of new manufacturing exports, essential for the successful 
diversification of the economy. The expansion of Iranian oil export earnings 
in the 1970s provides a good example of these effects. 12 
The second effect of concern is that, during the modernization and expan-
sion of the oil sector, the rest of the economy may be crowded out from 
access to key factor inputs. That is, the oil sector, with its financial resources, 
would preempt these resources, weakening the ability of the private sector to 
invest and diversify. 
The Dutch Disease also tends to result in increased poverty, but here the 
links are more difficult to establish. 13 The price distortions created by the 
appreciating exchange rate can be seen as a tax on exports, and, if the coun-
try has a trade pattern based on comparative advantage, this would likely 
involve labor-intensive activities. Rates of economic growth in these areas 
would decline, inhibiting any tendency for benefits of oil-based expenditures 
to "trickle down." Under these circumstances, the economy would likely 
become more vulnerable to external shocks from which the poor cannot pro-
tect themselves. Finally, the inflation stemming from expanded oil-financed 
expenditures would, again, likely harm the poor disproportionately. 
Although the disease is generally associated with a natural resource discovery, 
it can occur from any development that results in a large inflow of foreign cur-
rency, including a sharp surge in natural resource prices, foreign assistance, and 
FDI, all of which are distinct future possibilities for a country such as Iraq. 
The Rentier Society/ Authoritarian Effect 
The s~c~n~ ~imens'.~n ot~egati;e .oil-related effects has to do with govern-
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institutional and other policy changes. It also can lead to the development of 
a rentier society where there is often a disconnect between effort and reward. 
A common result is the creation of a dualistic economy where a vibrant oil 
and gas sector coexists with a weak, poorly performing non-oil economy. 
Along these lines, Halliday has noted that 
the uniqueness of oil resides ... in the peculiar form of payment resulting from 
it, a rent to producer states that does not entail the forward and backward linkages 
within the local economy that are characteristic of other primary production in 
the third world. The collection of this "rent'' enables the producer state, and 
those controlling it, to amass enormous sums of money without engaging in 
any form of production; it is this which has generated such major social tensions 
within the producer states. These tensions include growing income inequality, 
rampant corruption in the state, grandiose development projects, and the neg-
lect of productive activity and skills, especially in agriculture. 14 
Because oil infrastructure can be controlled easily by a few, it leads to a 
concentration of political power. Thus, rentier states tend to be authoritarian 
(as shown in table 3.4). There are several reasons for the political system to 
evolve in this direction. 15 First, an oil-rich government can provide vast social 
services without taxing the public. Because there's no taxation, there's less 
demand fi.)r representation. Rentier governments also tend to buy off the 
opposition and amass large internal security forces capable of crushing dis-
sent. Second, the skewed development of oil-dependent states means that 
they lack the working- and middle-class citizens, who historically have been a 
force pushing for democracy. In short, whereas oil exporters fall into a num-
ber of political categories, lack of accountability and transparency is a common 
characteristic of the group. Again, these patterns are readily apparent when, as 
noted earlier, comparisons arc made with so-called production economies 
(table 3.2). The net effect of these factors has led (to one degree or another) 
to corruption, mismanagement, and a colossal waste of resources. 
Table 3.4 Political dassilication of oil exporters 
Factional democracy 
Political ti:atures 
Government and parties often unstable relative to interest groups 
Political support gained through clientclistic ties and patronage 
Wide social disparities, lack of consensus 
Politicized bureaucracy and judicial system 
Institutional implications 
Short policy horizon 
Policy instability, nontransparency, high transaction costs 
Strong state role in production 
Strong interests attached directly to state expenditures 
Economic implications 
Table 3.4 Continued 
Rents transferred to different interests and public through subsidie,, 
policy distortions, and public employment 
Main Examples 
Ecuador, Venezuela, Colombia 
Paternalistic autocracy 
Political teatures 
Stable government, legitimacy originally from traditional role, 
maintained through rent di,tribution 
Strong cultural elements of consensus, clientelistic and nationalistic 
Bureaucracy provides both services and public employment 
Institutional implications 
Long horizon 
Policy stability, nontransparenq' 
Low Competitiveness, high transaction costs 
Strong state role in reduction 
Strong interests attached directly to state expenditures 
Weak private sector 
Economic implications 
Procyclical expenditure, mixed success with stabilization 
Risk of unsustainable long-term spending trajectory leading to 
political crisis 
Little economic diversification 
Main examples 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, UAE, Oman 
Political classification of oil exporters 
Political ti:atures 
Stable government, legitimized by development 
Social range of consensus toward development 




Policy stability, nontransparency 
Drive for competitiveness, low transaction costs 
Strong constituency for stabilization and fiscal restraining 
Economic implications 
Expenditure smoothing stabilization 
State investment complementary to competitive private sector 
Active exchange rate management to limit Dutch Disease 
Main examples 
Nigeria (elected governments), Indonesia 
Predatory autocracy 
Political features 
Unstable government, legitimized by military force 
Lack of consensus-building mechanisms 
Bureaucracy exists as mechanism of rent capture and distribution 
Corrupt judicial system 
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Table 3.4 Continued 
Polkv instability, no transparency 
Low competitiveness, high transaction costs 




High procydical expenditure 
Very high government consumption, rate absorption bv elites through 
petty corruption and patrrnuge, capital flight 
Main examples 
Nigeria ( milit.iry governments), I ra4 
•
1
•to11n-t: EitCrt, Gelb, Jnd T.11lroth, 2003. 
Whereas Saudi Arabia's political system dearly falls in the "paternalistic 
autocracy" group, Iran's is rather unique and hence more difficult to charac-
terize. The Iranian state appears to be guided by a "benevolent neutrality" in 
its relations with citizens where any modification (in the fixm of decreases in 
subsidies, for example) or reduction in living standards has a major political 
impact. These forces arc offset to a certain degree by an additional element 
ensuring the cohesion of the system: a strong ideological system (Shi'ite 
Islam) encompassing all economic and political spheres, both at the public 
and private level. 10 
The Fiscal Uncertainty Effect 
The final dimension of oil-related problems stems from the fiscal implications 
of fluctuating and uncertain revenues. Although one cannot say that oil rev-
enues create a certain political system, it is a fact that, for the most part, the 
political systems adopted by most of the oil-exporting countries are short-
sighted and pursue a pro-cyclical stabilization policy. The net effect is to 
intensify the detrimental impact that fluctuations in oil prices have on the 
domestic economy. 
Oil-exporting countries' budgetary patterns tend to be an extreme version 
of the fiscal rules used in many developing countries facing fluctuating rev-
enues. Many of these countries initiate expanded capital expenditures during 
periods of rising revenues on the assumption that these revenues are sustain-
able. When revenues decline, budgetary cuts occur, but in a fairly predictable 
manner. 17 In general, social sectors are less vulnerable to cuts than defense 
and administration, which, in turn, are considerably less vulnerable than 
production and infrastructure. 18 Of course, these patterns can be affected by 
the willingness of countries to assume increased governmental debt in an 
attempt to maintain programs during periods of declining revenues. Another 
complicating factor, especially for Middle Eastern oil exporters, is their large 
budgetary commitment to defense expenditures. These factors c~mbine _to 
•. 
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Budgetary Patterns in Saudi Arabia 
As is well known, Saudi Arabia has experienced ongoing budget difficulties 
since the mid- l 980s. Growing deficits have been the norm with non-oil 
revenues unable to pick up the slack during periods of falling oil revenues. 
What is less well known is that the composition of public expenditures has 
been undergoing some profound changes during this period. Of particular 
significance is the fact that economic expenditures (economic services, trans-
port and communications, and infrastructure) have declined steadily since 
1980, from around 25 percent of the budget at that time to a little over 
7 percent by 2003. 19 Social expenditures (human resource development and 
health) have been the major beneficiaries of the decline in economic alloca-
tions more than doubling their share of the budget over the period 
1979-2003 (from 13 percent to nearly 32 percent of total expenditures). 
As noted, defense remains the largest budgetary item, fluctuating in the 
35-40 percent range in the period after 1988 (figure 3.2). 
Public expenditures (administration, loans, and subsidies) have shown the 
most erratic pattern. After fluctuating at around 35 percent of the budget 
between 1979 and 1994, they tell sharply to less than 20 percent in 1999 
only to increase to about 27 percent in 2003. The sharp decline in public 
expenditures in the early-to-mid-l 990s stemmed, in part, from a sharp 
cutback in the government's loan programs. 
The patterns described are suggestive of an environment in which the 
public sector is contracting in many areas. This is especially the case with 
regard to economic expenditures and other activities directly supportive of 
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most obvious manitestation of this phenomenon. Falling shares of invest-
ment relative to non-oil output arc also indicative of Saudi Arabia's capital 
stock and productive expenditures playing much less of a stimulating role as 
in the unbalanced growth strategy implicit in the early oil-boom years. 20 
More subtle shifts in policy or policy effectiveness can only be inferred 
from a more detailed analysis of budgetary patterns and their impacts. Of par-
ticular importance are the linkages between public and private sector expen-
ditures (output) on non-oil production and investment. In this regard, a 
common theme in the development literature is that economic processes in 
oil-based countries become more complex as these economies mature and 
begin tu diversify away from a complete reliance on oil revenues and associ-
ated public sector expenditures. There is clear evidence that this process is well 
advanced in Saudi Arabia.21 With regard to the economy's leading productive 
sectors, several patterns stand out:22 
( 1) Growth in the agricultural and mining sectors became more dependent 
on private expenditures and less dependent on public expenditures, espe-
cially during the 1975-2001 period. 
(2) The non-oil manufacturing sector has become almost completely 
dependent on private sector expenditures, with strong linkages to these 
expenditures in both the short and longer term. In contrast, public sec-
tor expenditures now have little stimulating effects on the sector. 
( 3) Traditionally the wholesale and retail trade sectors have been dependent 
on both public and private sector expenditures. Whereas this remains the 
case for private sector expenditures, public sector expenditures currently 
have only a short-run transitory effect on the sector's output. 
( 4) In a major change from earlier periods, output in the construction sector 
is no longer dependent on public expenditures. Instead, output in this 
sector now depends primarily on the long-term pattern of private sector 
expenditures. 
( 5) Private expenditures have strengthened their linkages to the housing sec-
tor as well as to transport, storage, and communications sectors. 
Although output in this sector is still responsive to public sector expen-
ditures, this linkage has weakened over time. 
( 6) Other financial activities arc dependent on private expenditures. 
However with regard to public expenditures, this effect is confined to 
the longer-term effrcts of governmental expenditures. 
(7) Finallv, linkages between private expenditures and the service sector 
(community, social, and personal services) have strengthened consider-
ably in recent years. This sector's links to public sector expenditures have 
also weakened. 
In sum, the pattern found here is one of strengthening linkages between 
private sector expenditures and sectoral output. At the same time, the ability 
,.,,f-- r.11h1;,- "'"r~~-,,..- ,.,,,,....,,,.,...,.,-1:~ .. ~~""" ~,.,,. ..__, .... ,.,:~ .... - ....... ~: ..... : .... .-- ~.._: ____ I .. .-.,_ _____ .._ ___ .._ J __ _ 
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manufacturing and construction, public sector expenditures no longer play a 
role in affecting output growth. In other areas, such as agriculture, mining, 
trade, and services, public expenditures may only play a minor role in the 
overall growth of these areas of activity. 
The question that immediately arises concerns the factors responsible for 
the deterioration in links between government expenditures and, for all prac-
tical purposes, the rest of the economy. Given the fall in the relative share of 
government expenditures in such areas as non-oil GDP, diminishing returns 
can no doubt be ruled out. The major changes in the composition of the 
government's budget noted above would appear to be a more likely source of 
the decline in the strength of public sector linkages. 
Again, in aggregating the various sections of the government's budget 
into four main categories (social expenditures, economic expenditures, pub-
lic expenditures, and detCnse ), several interesting statistical patterns emerge 
that may help to explain the effect of public expenditures on the non-oil 
private sector. First, looking at the links between government revenues and 
expenditures, economic expenditures, public expenditures, and defense 
spending reveals a similar pattern: each expands in the short run with 
increased government revenues (of course, they would also contract with 
falling revenues). This pattern carries over into the longer term with each cat-
egory of expenditure maintaining a stable relationship with revenues.23 
On the other hand, there do not appear to be any links, either short or 
long term, between revenues and social expenditures. As noted, this category 
has been the fastest growing category of expenditures. More importantly, it, 
along with defense, now dominates the government budget. The fact that 
the expansion in social expenditures appears to be independent of the 
government's revenue position suggests that either these allocations receive a 
much higher priority over other expenditures and/ or that the government is 
willing to incur large deficits to fund these programs. No doubt their rather 
steady increase until the last several years means that they have played a rather 
limited role in fiscal macroeconomic stabilization. 
A closer look at social expenditures reveals that their budgetary share has 
grown largely at the expense of several economic sections of the budget, 
namely transport, communications, and direct economic allocations. Short 
run increases in social expenditures had a negligible impact on their budgetary 
shares. However, the more fundamental long-term impact was clearly nega-
tive. The only economic category not adversely affected was infrastructure, 
where social expenditures did not appear to affect this categories' budgetary 
share in either the short or longer term. The dramatic decline in the budget-
ary share of subsidies may be attributed in part to the growth of social expen-
ditures. Both the short- and long-term impacts of expanded social 
expenditures reduced the proportion of the budget allocated to subsidies. 
Interestingly, detense allocations did not suffer at the hands of social 
expenditures.2"' Short-run increases in the budgetary share going to social 
,~.,t-Prn,r1Pc- .,,~t-n"llu inrrP"\cPA t-hP ch'lrP nf t-hP h11rl<!Pt" ,-nnt-rnJlpd hv dpff..n~t" 
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were the only budgetary subcategory unatlected by the expansion of social 
expenditures. The contraction of this category apparently was due, in part, to 
a shift in governmental priorities rather than a direct allocation conflict with 
social expenditures. 
In short, the high priority given to social expenditures, followed by defrnse 
together with limited oil revenues during most of this period, resulted in a 
tremendous contraction in the public sector's allocation to economic services 
of various types. 
Patterns of Productivity and Growth 
The three dimensions of the "Paradox of Plenty"-Dutch Disease, rentier 
state, and fiscal uncertainty-have combined to produce, in part, the dismal 
performance of rentier states noted earlier. This pattern has been confirmed 
in a recent study examining the sources of economic growth in various 
parts of the world.25 At issue is how much of the growth in output per 
worker is associated with growth in physical and human capital per worker 
and how it can be attributed to other factors, such as technological change. 
This latter category is often referred to in the literature as total factor 
productivity (TFP). 26 
The importance ofTfP stems from the fact that, in its absence, economic 
growth eventually slows and stagnates due to diminishing returns to capital 
formation. Within this context, there are striking differences in the manner in 
which oil and non-oil economies grow (see table 3.5): 
( l) Looking at the Middle East as a whole, oil exporters have sustained an 
average output growth of 0.83 percent. Associated with this expansion 
has been a growtl1 in physical capital of2.24 percent and in human capital 
of 1.96 percent. 
(2) These growth rates occurred in an environment characterized by nega-
tive growth in total factor productivity per worker of 1.22 percent. 
( 3) The high negative rates of growth of TFP for the major oil exporters is 
particularly telling: Iraq (-1.92), Oman (-2.28 ), Saudi Arabia (-2.99), 
Iran (-0.95), and UAE (-2.89). 
( 4) In contrast, non-oil exporters in the Middle East grew about twice as fast 
( 1.59 versus 0.83) and invested at a rate about twice that of the oil 
exporters ( 4.94 versus 2.24 ). And, if Yemen, an oil producer, is omitted, 
they had less of a decline in TFP ( -0.47 versus -1.22 ). Noteworthy 
here arc the positive TFPs achieved by the major economics: Egypt 
(0.19), Israel (0.10), Morocco (0.02), and Tunisia (0.15). 
( 5) Oil exporters allocated a proportionate amount of resources to human 
capital ( 1.96 percent versus 1.86 percent for the non-oil producers). 
( 6) Other oil exporters experienced similar patterns with stagnant grmvth 
(0.07 percent) and total factor productivity per worker declining by 
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Table 3.5 Average growth of output and input by country 
Growth rate per worker 
first year Output Capital Human capital TFP 
· Middle East 
Oil exporters 
Algeria 1948 3.00 3.04 1.85 0.76 
Iran 1956 1.56 3.02 2.26 -0.95 
Iraq 1950 1.14 5.51 1.86 -1.92 
Kuwait 1980 -0.35 -4.58 1.55 0.12 
Libya 1960 3.68 4.99 2.47 0.38 
Oman 1970 0.67 4.63 2.11 -2.28 
Saudi Arabia 1960 0.70 7.73 1.70 -2.99 
lJAE 1980 -3.74 -6.42 1.89 -2.89 
Average 0.83 2.24 1.96 -1.22 
Non-oil exporters 
Egypt 1917 2.00 2.63 1.14 0.19 
Israel 1948 3.10 4.64 2.20 0.10 
Jordan 1960 1.36 4.16 1.61 -1.09 
Moroc~o 1951 1.77 2.54 1.36 O.o2 
Syria 1953 0.76 4.37 2.25 -2.19 
Tunisia 1956 2.61 2.99 2.20 0.15 
Yemen 1970 -0.44 13.24 2.27 -6.33 
Average 1.59 4.94 1.86 -1.31 
Other oil exporters 
Norway 1855 2.05 2.68 0.89 0.57 
Nigeria 1952 0.08 3.76 1.12 -1.91 
Venezuela 1936 0.55 2.41 1.46 -1.22 
Ecuador 1950 1.15 3.32 2.13 -1.36 
Indonesia 1951 1.76 4.21 1.72 -0.78 
Russia 1917 1.98 3.72 1.74 -0.41 
Azerbaijan 1990 -6.40 -4.41 2.92 -6.90 
Kazakhstan 1990 -0.65 -1.24 2.47 -1.89 
Average 0.07 1.81 1.81 -1.74 
Southern european 
Cyprus 1950 6.03 6.66 1.81 2.62 
Greece 1910 2.85 3.41 1.24 0.89 
Italy 1861 1.79 2.57 0.96 0.30 
Portugal 1849 1.97 2.46 0.75 0.65 
Spain 1857 1.34 1.77 0.82 0.21 
Turkev 1935 1.99 2.12 1.36 0.38 
Average 2.66 3.17 1.16 0.84 
,'\ourcc: Adapted from Scott L Baier, Gerald Dwyer. and Robert Tamura. "How Important Arc Capital and 
Tor:U Factor Productivity for Growth, April 2002, at \\'\\W.vandcrbilt.edu/Ernn/faculty/Crucmi/t.11nura.pdf 
Total Factor Productivity in Iran 
A more detailed examination of TFP in Iran sheds further light on possible 
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manner in which increased schooling is allocated, one gets two estimates of 
TFP in Iran, each with a particular bias. The noninclusion of the effect of 
increased schooling on the productivity of the labor force results (as shown 
in table 3.6) in appositive contribution of TFP to growth during the 
1969-2002 period (because changes in the quality of the labor force are 
implicitly included in TFP). Using an alternative specification assuming 
human capital increases linearly with the average years of schooling, the con-
tribution of TFP to growth becomes negative ( - 1.2 percent on average dur-
ing the 1960-2002 period). 
Under both accounting exercises, the contribution of TFP to growth is 
positive during the high growth subperiod of 1960-76 and becomes negative 
during the political turmoil and war period of 1977-78. This result points to 
the critical importance of political and external developments for Iran's 
economic growth. The results differ in the growth accounting for 1989-2002. 
Under the first specification, in which human capital equals raw labor, the 
contribution ofTFP to growth is positive. On the other hand, if we assume a 
linear effect of education to human capital, the contribution ofTFP becomes 
negative. As the IMF notes,28 a more realistic TFP estimate may lie between 
these two extreme cases. In particular, it is likely there was a very small (or 
even negative) contribution ofTFP to growth during the 1989-2002 subpe-
riod due to slow progress in structural reforms and increased macroeconomic 
instability. 
If Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the other rcntier states want to achieve better 
economic performance, their governments will have to create an environ-
ment that encourages and forces sustained levels of positive TFP. Again, it is 
unlikely this has happened on a sustained basis in the oil economies outside 
of Norway. 
Table 3.6 Iran: Sources of economic growth, 1960-2002 
Contribution of 
Period Average growth rate Capital Raw labor TFP 
1960-76 9.8 3.9 1.2 4.7 
1977-88 -2.4 1.7 1.4 -5.5 
1989-2002 4.7 2.3 1.5 1.0 
1960-2002 4.6 2.1 1.4 1.1 
Capital Human capital TFP 
1960-76 9.8 3.9 2.7 3.2 
1977-88 
-2.4 1.7 5.5 -9.6 
1989-2002 4.7 2.3 4.3 -1.8 
1960-2002 4.6 2.1 3.7 -1.2 
,,,., .. ,-... r .. 1 ... ~ .. ;,. u ...... 1.r:. l. ·' --~. J T-··· ., flH--1.: .•••.. 
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COMMONALITY IN REFORM EFFORTS 
There is still great controversy over the best way to stimulate TFP. For some 
analysts, increased competition, privatization, and greater incentives for risk-
taking are key. 29 For others, the establishment of supporting institutions (i.e., 
·an independent central bank, a sound financial system, and efficient, equi-
table tax systems) play a central role. 30 Both of these strategics are critically 
dependent on the progress made in economic reforms (economic freedom) 
and improved governance. 
Economic Freedom 
Both the Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal's Index of Economic 
Freedom,31 and the Fraser lnstitute's Economic Freedom of the World32 provide 
good measures of the relative progress made by countries in moving to a 
deregulated, limited government, free-market environment. Because the 
Heritage Foundation data set included more of the Middle Eastern coun-
tries, it was used for the analysis that follows. The Heritage Index reflects the 
absence of government constraint or coercion on the production, distribu-
tion, or consumption of goods and services. Stripped to its essentials, economic 
freedom is concerned with property rights and choice. To measure economic 
freedom the Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal index takes ten 
different factors into account: 
• Trade policy 
• Fiscal burden of government 
• Government intervention in the economy 
• Monetary policy 
• Banking and finance 
• Capital flows and foreign investment 
• Wages and prices 
• Property rights 
• Regulation 
• Informal market. 
Implied in these measures is the notion that economic freedom also 
requires governments to refrain from many activities. They must refrain from 
actions that interfere with personal choice, voluntary exchange, and the free-
dom to enter and compete in labor and product markets. Economic freedom 
is reduced when taxes, government expenditures, and regulations arc substi-
tuted for personal choice, voluntary exchange, and market coordination. 
Restrictions that limit entry into occupations and business activities also 
retard economic freedom. 
The index provides a framework for assessing progress toward a modern 
m::irlrt>t Pronomv intPO"r:>tP~ into thP aloh::il Pronomv· how onPn countries ;tre 
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through taxation, spending, or overregulation ), and the strength and inde-
pendence of a country's judiciary to enforce rules and protect private prop-
erty. Some countries may have freedom in all factors; others may have 
freedom in just a fow. One of the most important findings of research carried 
out using the index is that economic freedom is required in all aspects of eco-
nomic lite. Countries must score well in all ten of the factors in order to 
improve thei~, economic efficiency and consequently the living standards of 
their people.'·' 
As noted earlier, Saudi Arabia's progress in attaining economic freedom 
has been rather slow, suggesting that despite the fact that a number of 
reforms have been enacted in recent years, their impact has been somewhat 
limited. According to the Heritage/Wall Street Journal index, economic 
freedom by 2004 was a bit lower than in the mid- l 990s (figure 5. l ) . In 
1996, Saudi Arabia was classified as mostly free (index= 2.95). Starting in 
1999, however, Saudi Arabia's economic freedom index moved into a range 
characterized as mostly un-free, reaching its lowest point in 2002. 34 
Saudi Arabia's relative lack of economic freedom is illustrated by particu-
larly low scores (table 3 .7) in several of the ten categories noted above: trade 
policy; government intervention; foreign investment; and banking and 
finance. ln fact, the country consistently received a "free" score in only one 
area-monetary policy. Wages and pri~es and fiscal burden were the. only 
areas consistently receiving a "mostly free" score, whereas trade policy, 
government intervention, foreign investment, and banking and finance con-
sistently received scores of "repressed." Clearly, these are the areas that need 
the most immediate attention. 
In contrast to Saudi Arabia, Iran's economy has been in the "repressed" 
range as defined by the economic freedom index. Hopes for broad-based 
economic reform were raised under President Mohammed Khatami, who was 
reelected in June 2001. But, Khatami's reform efforts were largely thwarted 
by opposition from entrenched interests, government bureaucrats who 
Table 3. 7 Saudi Arabia and Iran: Progress in economic freedom, 2004 
Sandi Arabia Iran 
0Yerall score 3.1 4.3 
Trade policy 4.0 2.0 
Fisc,11 burden 2.0 3.6 
Govi:rnn1t.·nt intervention in the ci:onon1y 4.5 5.0 
Monetary policy 1.0 4.0 
Capital tlows .ind foreign investment 4.0 4.0 
B.inking and finance 4.0 5.0 
Wages and prices 2.0 4.0 
Property rights 3.0 5.0 
Regnl.uion 3.0 5.0 
Black marker 3.0 5.0 
REFORMING THE RENTIER STATE 55 
manage many of the state enterprises, and Islamic hardliners in the judiciary 
and other state institutions who value ideological purity over economic 
progress. As a result, Khatami made little progress in reforming the economy. 
Iran's economic freedom lags behind that of Saudi Arabia in all areas with 
t:he exception of trade policy. The country receives the lowest score possible 
( 5.0) in a number of areas including, (a) government intervention, (b) bank-
ing and finance, (c) property rights, (d) regulation, and (e) informal (black) 
markets. 
Looking at the specific areas of economic freedom, several distinctive 
patterns stand out between the two countries. 
Trade Policy. Saudi Arabia receives consistently low scores in this area largely 
because of~ wide range of nontariff barriers. Saudi Arabia also has a number 
of preferences for Gulf Cooperation Council ( GCC) countries as well as a 
vast government program that favors domestic producers. Hopefully, the 
phasing out of these restrictions will also pave the way for Saudi Arabia's 
entry into the World Trade Organization. 
I;an's trade policy score in the 2004 index was 2.0, signifying a relatively 
open economy. The country's weighted average tariff rate in the 2004 
index was 3.1 percent, down from the 6.1 percent rate in the 2003 index. 
In contrast, Saudi Arabia's average tariff is approximately 10.0 percent. 
Traditionally the main instruments used by Iran to restrict trade were non-
tariff barriers and the system of multiple exchange rates. However, with the 
unification of the exchange rate, the country has taken a major stride toward 
freer trade. 
Government Intervention. Saudi Arabia was considered to have a low degree 
of economic freedom in this area because of the high level of government con-
sumption (27 percent of GDP in 2001). A gradual shift in budget priorities 
toward investment and away from government salaries/welfare state should 
assist Saudi Arabia's movement to a higher degree of economic freedom with-
out disrupting the economy or risking higher levels of unemployment. 
Iran received the lowest score possible ( 5.0) in this area, largely because of 
its inefficient state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and politically powerful indi-
viduals and institutions such as the bonyad (Islamic charities that control large 
business conglomerates). The bonyad have established a tight grip on much 
of the non-oil economy, utilizing their preferential access to domestic credit, 
foreign exchange, licenses, and public contracts to protect their positions. 
These advantages have made it difficult for the private sector to compete and, 
as a result, it remains small and incapable of playing a major role in creating 
new employment opportunities. 
Capital Flows and Foreign Investment. Although Saudi Arabia receives a rel-
atively low score in this area, the country appears to be actively working to 
,....J1m1n·lf'P m'lnu nf thP Pvl~r-ino- rf""'f"rirf"lnn'i: HowPvf"r much \\Tork rem~lnc;; tn 
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actual practice. 3° Commonly noted problems for foreign investors include: the 
existence of many disincentives to invest (including the absence of accurate 
data); a government requirement that companies hire Saudi nationals; slow 
payment of government contracts; a restrictive visa policy for all workers; and 
enforced segregation of the sexes in most businesses. 
Iran received a similar score for reforms in this area. However, in 2002 the 
government updated its foreign investment code for the first time in over 
SO years with the enactment of the Law on the Attraction and Protection of 
Foreign Investment. Certain limitations on foreign investment were incorpo-
rated into this law including the prohibition of a market share of greater than 
25 percent in one sector or J5 percent in individual industries. The statute 
also guaranteed market-rate compensation for assets that are nationalized. 
Most importantly, the country now allows for international arbitration in 
legal disputes, addressing a key concern of foreign investors. By late 2004, 
however, hard-liners were advancing a legislative agenda in the Iranian par-
liament that would effectively hamper fixeign investment, make it more dif· 
ficult for the government to negotiate deals with foreign companies, and roll 
back privatization plans:l0 
Banking and Finance. The Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority, the country's 
central bank, maintains tight control over the country's banking system. Saudi 
domestic commercial banks are heavily exposed to the government and to 
contractors dependent on government payments. A~ a result, the country 
receives a fairly low score in this area. A major complaint is that credit institu-
tions such as the Saudi Industrial Development Fund (SIDF) allocate credit 
based largely_on government-set criteria rather than on market conditions. 
Iran's banking and finance system received the lowest score possible. A 
number of factors contributed to the sector's dismal state of affairs, includ-
ing the fact that the ability of banks to charge interest is restricted under 
Iran's interpretation oflslamic law, and much of the country's commercial 
bank loan portfolio is tied up in low return loans to state-owned enter-
prises and politically connected individuals and businesses. However, in 
2000 the government began permitting private banks for the first time 
since the revolution. Several private banks have opened, but they are not 
expected to have a major impact on the country's financial svstem because 
their operations arc tightly regulated. Their ability to attrac.t funds is also 
limited by the central bank's policy that limits the interest rate they set to 
within 2 percentage points of those offered bv the state-owned commer-
cial banks. . 
Wages and Prices. The Saudi Arabian domestic market for private goods and 
services is fairly free of wage and price controls. Religious leaders in the country 
consider market interforcnces as contrary to Islamic law. Hence, the country 
received a relatively high score in this area. However, in the past, public 
sector P-nocis ;lnd servirf"" <::nrh :1"- u.r:.ltf"r :ind nnnrrar h":lvP nffPn hPPn hP'lvlhr 
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cut back many subsidies, some remain, especially for basic food commodities, 
utilities, medicines, and cement. 
Iran has made some progress in this area in recent years with the deregu-
_Jation and abolishment of the "price enforcement courts." Still, the country 
_received a fairly low score largely because of massive subsidies and price con-
trols on "essential" items such as fuel, power, and basic foodstuffs. The total 
cost of these subsidies is currently in the range of US$8-l 0 billion annually. 
In addition, the government sets minimum wages for each sector and region. 
Property Rights. The Saudi judiciary is not perceived as independent, but as 
influenced by other branches of government. In addition, many businessmen 
complain that the enforcement of contracts is slow and often arbitrary. A 
recurring complaint is that the Saudi courts more often than not side witl1 
local partners when disputes involve foreign firms or individuals. This is espe-
cially true in the case of well-connected Saudis. 
Property rights arc even more tenuous in Iran. The country again received 
a 5.0 or the lowest score possible due to the widely held view that property 
rights arc not protected. A common complaint is that the rule of law in Iran 
is inconsistent or unsatisfactory. The courts are unwieldy and rarely arrive at 
a swift resolution. Many firms will not deal with Iran because the court system 
is perceived to be under government or religious influence. At best the judicial 
system is opaque. At worst it is corrupt and arbitrary. 
Regulation. There is considerable regulation in Saudi Arabia, but for the 
most part, it is not transparent or oriented toward serving the consumer. 
There are also many inconsistencies in the country's regulatory process. 
"Saudization" or the mandated quotas of Saudi nationals on payrolls, 
changes often and unexpectedly. The regulatory system also facilitates a high 
level of corruption. Bribes often disguised as "commissions" are common in 
many industries. This situation may change, however, as Crown Prince 
Abdullah has made anticorruption one of his major priorities. 
Again, Iran comes in with the lowest score possible. Many firms find deal-
ing with the government a long, tedious process. The government effectively 
discourages the establishment of new businesses. Contract negotiations are 
often lengthy, excessively detailed, and painfully slow to finalize. The whole 
process appears riddled \Vi.th corruption. President Khatami's efforts at 
reform have been thwarted by the bureaucracy and various religious leaders. 
In sum, there has been little movement toward increased economic free-
dom in Saudi Arabia during the last several years. In fact, during 1996-2004 
there was a slight deterioration in the country's overall index. Future move-
ments are difficult to predict simply because they appear to depend in large 
part on the state of the government's finances. When oil revenues are low and 
the government needs more employment generation in the private sector, 
there is usually increased resolve to undertake a new round of reforms. In 
2004. with oil prices high and revenues abundant. official discussions of 
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To some extent, otlicial resolve in Iran to push ahead with reforms mav 
also be driven by public finances. However, the failure of the reformers t~ 
make significant changes in the last frw years despite the seriousness of the 
country's unemployment suggests that the entrenched bureaucracy and 
Islamic hard-liners will remain a formidable obstacle to change in that c~untry. 
Even more ominous, a new Iranian neoconservative movement hostile to 
reform of any sort and comprising mostly young and fervent advocates of 
Isbmic republican ideals is making a bid to seize control of Iran's political 
agenda.38 
Governance 
In addition to economic freedom, democracy and governance are increas-
ingly seen as essential for long-run economic growth and prosperity. In fact, 
some dimensions of governance now sit at the center of academic and policy 
discussions of economic development. 39 Although the ranking of countries 
on the basis of their relative progress in attaining improved governance is 
inherently subjective, a recent World Bank study provides a set of rankings 
incorporating the full extent of our knowledge about this phenomenon. 40 
Mon: precisely, the World Bank data set presents a set of estimates of six 
dimensions of governance covering 199 countries and territories for 1996, 
1998, 2000, and 2002: voice and accountability, political stability and 
absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule oflaw, 
and control of corruption. 
REFORM GAPS AND CATCHING-UP 
As expected, the overall quality of governance in Saudi Arabia and Iran lies 
below the norm (as shown in table 3.8). Of the two countries, Saudi Arabia 
has made considerably more progress in several areas, with governance levels 
actually above the norm in political stability, rule of law, and control of 
corruption. Saudi Arabia is also near the norm in the areas of government 
effectiveness and regulatory quality. The country's big governance deficit is 
in voice and accountability. There is considerable room for improving its 
governance structures, but Saudi Arabia appears to have a good initial start in 
laying a fairly solid foundation for sustained economic growth. 
Iran's governance paints a stark contrast to that of Saudi Arabia, \.Vi th the 
country consistently below the norm. Also, many oflran's largest governance 
deficits fall in areas with direct economic ramifications: regulatory quality, 
control of corruption, and the rule of law. However, although the countrv 
did achieve some improvements over the 1996-2002 period in many of th~ 
governance subcategories, the country's overall average governance deterio-
rated due to a fairly sharp deterioration in political stability. 
As a whole, both Middle East rentier and non-rentier economies have lagged 
considerably behind other major groupings of countries (see r;ihlr .~ 9\ 41 
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Table 3.8 Governance attainment in Iran and Saudi Arabia 
Country Iran Saudi Arabia 
Voice accountability 
1996-98 -0.962 -1.263 
2000-02 -0.862 -1.333 
A,·eragc -0.912 --1.298 
Political stabilit\' 
1996-98 -0.191 0.028 
2000-02 -0.392 0.281 
Average -0.292 0.154 
Government etkctiYeness 
1996-98 -0.314 -0.221 
2000-02 -0.307 0.010 
Average -0.310 -0.106 
Regulatory quality 
1996-98 -1.515 -0.068 
2000-02 -1.273 -0.010 
Average -1.394 -0.039 
Rule of law 
1996-98 -0.610 0.804 
2000-02 -0.507 0.537 
Average -0.558 0.670 
Control of corruption 
1996-98 -0.702 0.022 
2000-02 -0.497 0.326 
AYerage -0.599 0.174 
Overall gowrnance 
1996-98 -0.640 -0.032 
2000-02 -0.678 -0.074 
Average -0.716 -0.053 
Thailand, Mexico, and so on-have made considerably more progress in 
nearlv all of the major areas of reform. In turn, there is a comparable, but 
gene~ally smaller, gap between the various reform measures of the catching-up 
and advanced, endogenous growth countries.43 
The reform gap between the Middle East rentier and non-rentier 
economies varies considerablv with the rentier states attaining lower levels in 
voice and accountability, bu; higher scores in the other major categories. In 
the economic area, the rentier states are much more interventionist than their 
non-rentier counterparts. Rentier states also lag in creating an environment 
conducive to foreign investors and in domestic price and wage reform. On 
the other hand, the rentier states lag considerably behind the more successful 
(catching-up) developing countries, especially in the area of governance. 
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Although it would not necessarily guarantee the economic successes 
enjoyed by the catching-up countries, progress in a number of areas of 
reform is no doubt a necessary first step in transitioning into an environment 
capable of encouraging those economic forces necessary for achieving 
self-sustained growth. Statistically, the Middle East rentier states and the 
catching-up countries fall into two unique groupings based on their progress in 
(1) voice and accountability, and (2) reducing corruption.44 In other words, 
knowing the progress made in just these two areas would allow one to predict 
which grouping a country belonged with a 96.8 percent chance of success. In 
all of the areas needing increased reform efforts, these two, especially voice 
and accountability, should have the highest priority. 
A further statistical45 analysis (see figure 3.3) of the dimension40 leading 
from rentier to catching-up status suggests the Middle East rentier states fall 
into three groupings of relative progress based on the level of voice and 
accountability reform: ( 1) a low group comprising of Iraq, Libya, and Saudi 
Arabia; ( 2) an intermediate group consisting of Algeria, Bahrain, Iran, 
Oman, Qatar, and the UAE; and ( 3) the top group consisting only of Kuwait. 
Once progress in voice and accountability enables the threshold to catching-
up status to be reached, improvement in regulatory quality would become a 
top priority for further advancement. 
As a basis of comparison, in their quest to become high performing devel-
oping countries, the non-rentier economies in the Middle East must first 
achieve significant progress in reforming three key areas (in declining order 
of importance): ( 1) voice and accountability; (2) foreign investment; and 
(3) fiscal burden. For this group, the dimension leading to catching-up status 
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Figure 3.4 Steps in Middle Fast non-rcntier, catching-up country progn:ssion. 
Although Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Turkey have made the most 
progress in moving toward an environment more conducive for economic 
success, it is clear that they have a considerable distance to go before reach-
ing that goal. Of the three main clusters of pre-catching-up countries, none 
has reached the third stage. 
Although these findings provide interesting insights as to the challenges 
confronting the Middle Eastern countries, the question remains as to 
whether this is the best perspective for examining the two key rentier states in 
the region, Saudi Arabia and Iran. Clearly these two countries are consider-
ably larger, both economically and demographically, than the other Gulfren-
ticr states. Does this size factor systematically define a reform strategy unique 
to their needs? 
To test whether a meaningfol delineation of rentier states exists, several 
larger non-Middle Eastern rentier economies-Angola, Nigeria, and 
Venezuela-were added to the analysis. As before, using the five governance 
and ten economic freedom variables as the basis of profiling unique policy 
environments shows (in table 3.10) considerable differences between them. 
The states fall into two groups: one with relatively large rentier states com-
posed of Algeria, Angola, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, and 
\'cnezuela, and the other with smaller rentier states-Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Oman, Qatar, and the llAE. 
In particular, the larger rentier states have lagged considerably behind the 
smaller states in all areas of governance. Although the gaps are not as large, 
the larger rcntier economics have also not made nearlv the same rrogress as 
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Somewhat surprisingly, the key reform area separating the two groups of 
countries is trade policy with the larger rentier countries lagging considerably 
behind their smaller counterparts. Just knowing the relative attainment of 
reforms in this area would have been sufficient to have correctly classified, 
with a high degree of probability, each country as a large or small retainer 
economv. 
The progression from largest (Angola, Iraq, Libya, Nigeria) to smallest_ 
( UAE) rentier state is defined by the progress made in the governance area ot 
regulatory quality (figure 3.5) with the smaller rent~er states define~ as a cl~ts­
ter of high regulatory quality environments. A middle cluster of countnes 
consists of Saudi Arabia and Venezuela with moderate attainment in this area. 
The remaining large rentier economies, including Iran, are in a cluster of 
extremely low regulatory quality. These findings arc consistent with the fact 
that the large rentier economies have pursued considerably different devel-
opment strategies than their smaller counterparts. Because of their larger 
populations and domestic markets, industrialization made a certain amount 
of economic sense for this group. This industrialization has been achieved in 
large part through an inward-oriented import substitution strategy as evi-
denced, in part, by the group's lack of progress (openness) in trade policy. 
The findings are also consistent with the patterns of declining effectiveness 
of government expenditures in Saudi Arabia and Iran, as well as the observed 
negative TFP in both countries. Lack of good regulation (together with 
other reform deficiencies) in both countries has limited the potentially posi-
tive economic role of governments in both countries. Negative TFP is also 
found in many developing countries attempting to industrialize through rel-
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If higher oil revenues over the next kw years are not sufficient to begin 
reducing both countries' unemployment problems, increased reforms will have 
to be given a much higher priority than at present. This is especially the case in 
many key governance areas such as voice and accountability and regulatory 
reform. Government expenditures will have to be refocused on activities that 
directly support private sector investment. In Saudi Arabia's case (and to a 
lesser extent Iran's), the welfare state will have to be scaled back and a higher 
priority given to economic allocations. More emphasis must be placed on effi-
ciency and productivity in government activities. There is also tremendous 
waste in government ministries that will have to be dealt with. In short, an 
environment will have to be created that encourages investment and provides 
better incentives for risktaking and job creation. Without these efforts, grow-
ing unemployment, rising pm·erty, and unfulfilled expectations will produce a 
volatile situation, perhaps beyond the control of either government. 
TRANSITION STRATEGIES 
Interestingly, nearly all of the patterns of governance, economic reform, and 
transition out of the rentier state described here are consistent with the 
assumptions underlying a model of growth and terrorism developed by 
Bremer and Kasarda.48 Bremer and Kasarda see countries moving through 
three distinct stages as their economies evolve and become more sophisti-
cated and market driven. By their criterion, Saudi Arabia and Iran fall in the 
first stage (along with countries such as Egypt and Pakistan) (see figure 3 .6). 
This group of economies has failed to move forward to the middle stage 
largely because of growth-limiting policies (captured by the various measures 
of economic freedom) and institutional rigidities (depicted by the various 
areas of governance). 
To this basic economic/governance framework, Bremer and Kasarda add 
the dimensions of disillusionment and resentment. In effect, these countries 
have had a "failed take-off" in Rostow's terms.49 Expectations of rapidly 
improved standards ofliving have been raised only to be left unfulfilled by the 
inability of the economy to sustain growth. Following Hirschman's observa-
tions on income disparity in developing countries, the tolerance of lower-
income groups for large-income inequalities also wears thin as they sec their 
dreams of a better lite fade, especially if they perceive the country's elites are 
a source of the country's economic stagnation or decline.50 
The key feature of Bremer and Kasarda's model is the historical record: 
"History suggests that failure to make steady progress through the New 
Second World transition's early phase to the middle period is extremely dan-
gerous. If the transition stalls here-as it did in post-World War I Russia, and 
as it has now in much of the Middle East-failure can lead to revolution and 
al Qaeda-style international violence. "51 The one thing that the nations stuck 
in the early phase have in common is slowness in adopting choice-based 
systems. Bremer and Kasarda define "choice-based" svstems as encompassing 
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organizations-basically the economic freedom and governance measures 
noted earlier. 
The large rentier states appear particularly susceptible to the failed 
processes noted by Bremer and Kasarda. By any standard, the economic free-
dom and governance indicators of the first group (table 3 .11) lie well below 
that of the second group. Deficic1Kies are seen nearly across the board, but 
are particularly evident in regulatory quality and government intervention, 
areas where Bremer and Kasarda stress lack of reforms are likely to retard 
progress to higher stages. 
To further assess the relevance of the Bremer and Kasarda model for the 
Iarge rcntier economics, our set of six governance and ten economic freedom 
variables were examined statistically to see if they were capable of classifying 
groups of countries in a manner similar to those described by Bremer and 
Kasarda. The analysis was successful in identifying Stage 1 and Stage 3 as 
unique groupings based on their relative progress made in reforms. 
Significantly, all of the large renticr economics tdl in the first stage with a 
high degree of correct placement in this category. In addition, a group of 
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The variables critical for profiling the countries in these groups were (in 
declining order of importance): government efficiency, voice and accounta-
bility, and corruption. These arc all areas consistent with the Bremer and 
Kasarda contention that deficiencies cause growth in the first stage to fall to 
levels incapable of creating adequate jobs and sustaining economic growth. 
As noted earlier, another area stressed by Bremer and Kasarda, improved 
regulatory quality, seems to be critical in moving countries along the New 
Second World dimension to higher stages (figure 3.7). In the progression to 
the second stage, Iran is in a group of countries with very low regulatory 
quality. Through their modest efforts at improving government effectiveness, 
the Iranians have passed Libya and Algeria. The country clearly lags behind 
Saudi Arabia (and Egypt and Turkey) in moving up the ladder to the second 
stage of Bremer and Kasarda 's New Second World of development. However, 
compared with the progress made by a country such as Israel, it is apparent 
the Saudis have a very long reform road ahead of them. 
None of this bodes particularly well for the Saudis or the Iranians. Both 
countries appear to be going down the road to disaster projected for 
Bremer and Kasarda's stage one countries. In Saudi Arabia's case, it is clear 
that ten or fifteen years ago, when many of the economy's problems were 
becoming clearly apparent, the government had time on its side. 52 A well 
thought-out neoliberal reform program stressing free markets, access to 
capital, integration into the world economy, and major efforts in the various 
areas of governance, especially regulation and corruption, could have been 
undertaken at a safe pace, laying the foundation for the transition to a higher 
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Instead, the government postponed hard decisions, hoping that a new oil 
boom would solve all of its problems. None was forthcoming, nor will one 
likely appear in the fi.lreseeable future after the current oil boom subsides. As 
a result, the Saudi authorities find an economy still mired in Bremer and 
Kasarda's first stage and facing an unemployment rate that is approaching 
30 percent. 53 Poverty is definitely on the rise and, even more ominously, an 
increasing number of Saudis complain that their national wealth is being 
plundered by corrupt members of the royal family. 54 Increasingly, one hears: 
there's a lot of frustration and anxiety among young Saudi men. Almost half of 
them have lost hope for the future. And they arc ripe for recruitment by Islamic 
extremists ... Adding to the frustration arc the lack of outlets for discussion 
and debate. Trade unions are barred as are all other protessional associa-
tions ... Saudi society has tew political tools to counter the extremism that has 
taken root here and the results are actions like the recent bombings in Riyadh. 55 
Domestic terrorism does not plague Iran nearly to the extent found in 
Saudi Arabia, nevertheless the picture in many ways is gloomier because Iran 
lags considerably behind Saudi Arabia in nearly all areas of reform. Vested 
interests in the existing system have greatly limited reform. Because many 
opposed to reform have religious legitimacy, there are only modest prospects 
for dramatic reforms in the near future. In turn, the reform gap has limited the 
private sector's ability to create jobs. At the same time rapid demographics are 
, overwhelming the public sector's ability to expand hiring. The result is a pro-
gressive breakdown of the link uniting the population to the state through the 
rentier distribution system. Given the government's low tolerance for direct 
protest, the population's growing dissatisfaction and frustration is likely to 
manifest itself in the form of increased political and economic instability. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR IRAQ 
Iraq certainly has a lot to learn from the experiences of Saudi Arabia and Iran. 
With the fall of Saddam, the country had the golden opportunity of starting 
with a clean slate. Perhaps because of the difficulties in moving ahead with 
reform, once entrenched interests were strengthened by the rentier state 
redistributive mechanisms. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was 
quick to install a package of reforms reminiscent of the shock therapy pro-
grams carried out in the early to mid- l 990s in many of the Transition 
Economies of Central and Eastern Europe. Overnight, Iraq became the most 
open economy in the Arab world. 56 
The reforms clearly incorporated much of the agenda originally laid out in 
the now somewhat discredited Washington Consensus. 57 The main thrust of 
the Washington Consensus was a set of actions that, if taken at an early stage 
of transition, should have facilitated a smooth evolution into the world 
economv. It consisted of manv elements of the economic fTecdom measures 
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(liberalization, stabilization, and fiscal austerity), stressing the importance 
of bringing down inflation and establishing economic growth. It also 
incorporated a numbt:r of elements of microeconomic reform (e.g., privati-
zation, promoting FDI), as well as structural/administrative reforms (e.g., 
property rights, replacement of quantitative restrictions). Specifo.:ally, these 
included: 
• Fiscal discipline: limits to budget deficits 
• Public expenditure priorities: redirect expenditure toward building human 
capital and infrastructure 
• Tax reform: broaden tax base and cut marginal tax rates 
• Financial liberalization: abolish interest rate controls 
• Ex~hange rates: introduce unified and competitive exchange rates 
• Trade liberalization: replace quantitative restrictions by tariffs and then 
reduce the tariffs over time 
• Foreign direct investment: encourage increased international capital 
inflows 
• Privatization: privatize state enterprises 
• Deregulation: regulate onlv satCty, environment, and financial sectors (i.e., 
prndential supervision) 
• Property rights: introduce secure enfi)fcement at lO\v cost 
Progress of reform design and implementation varies considerably by 
categories; the September 2003 CPA reforms have little to say about fiscal 
discipline or public expenditure priorities, no doubt due to the great uncer-
tainty surrounding oil revenues, the external debt situation, and foreign assis-
tance. Surprisingly, however, property rights, a key element of the neoliberal 
reforms, has received less attention than one might have expected. It is also 
clear that, by any measure, Iraq world score very high on an economic freedom 
index. On the other hand, very little has been implemented or even discussed 
in the important areas of complementary governance: corporate governance, 
:mticorruption, tlexible labor markets, World Trade Organization agreements, 
financial codes and standards, prudent capital account opening, noninterme-
diate exchange rate regimes, independent central banks/inflation targeting, 
social satCtv nets, and targeted poverty reduction. Of these, only some initial, 
albeit limi~ed, progress has occurred in the areas of financial standards and 
central hanking. 
Perhaps the intent of the CPA and the current provisional government is 
to simply deter many of the specifics in these areas to an elected Iraqi 
government. However, as the cases of Iran and Saudi Arabia illustrate, 
governance reform may be a more critical clement in assuring Iraq is able to 
progress along the path to a stable modern economy. Without significant 
improvement in these areas in the near foture, the country is likely to have 
nn hr th<'" disadvantages of the free market to show fix its reform effrirts. The 
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